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1 The Chains that Bind? 
 
 
Throughout history, technology has been instrumental in the undertaking of violent 
acts.  Perhaps as with no other area of technical development, weaponry makes 
explicit the potential for innovations to serve destructive ends.  With the development 
of new destructive capabilities have come attempts to establish and enforce 
agreements that certain acts are wholly inappropriate – that is, they lay outside the 
realm of the necessary, just or civil.  Establishing such accords entails surveying 
across the landscape of injuries and deaths inflicted in conflict in order to offer some 
general account of what is acceptable and what is not. 
 
With varying degrees of success, in the past attempts have been made to signal out 
crossbows, firearms, and poisons as deplorable options.
1
  At the start of the 21
st
 
century, through their actions and statements, many governments have reinforced long 
standing claims made by a wide range of social groups that chemical and biological 
weapons are abhorrent and unacceptable.  That some might use, proliferate, possess or 
be suspected of possessing such indiscriminate and deadly ‘weapons of mass 
destruction’ can, at least on some occasions, lead to a significant response in the 
international community of states.   
 
Although typically topics of less high profile media coverage, in recent years non-
governmental organizations have led efforts to halt or curtail the spread of landmines, 
small arms, cluster bombs and other weaponry.  A plethora of sometimes 
complementary, sometimes conflicting formal and informal means – international 
treaties, humanitarian law, customary law, rules of engagement, codes of conduct – 
have been employed to delineate the rights and wrongs with force.  Government 
officials deciding on the suitability of arms exports, non-governmental organizations 
campaigning for the end to state practices, or diplomats formulating international 
arms control treaties do so through making determinations about the relative 
acceptability of the development, deployment or use of weaponry.   
 
Existing international and national prohibitions identify various topics for concern: 
the types of weapons developed, their purpose, who uses them and in what 
circumstances, who suffers from them, or other consequences of their use.  Alterative 
determinations of what is the primary source of concern justify alterative assessments 
of what needs to be done.  In practice, agreement on the ‘it’ or ‘its’ that should be the 
center of attention often proves elusive.  Many may agree on the need to control 
‘weapons of mass destruction’, but what that should mean by way of specifics does 
not follow on in some straightforward fashion.  Despite the often expressed 
condemnation of this category of weaponry in political debate, there is arguably little 
interest today among nuclear nations in abolishing all such weapons, specifically the 
nuclear ones.  In addition, while limiting who possesses chemical, biological or 
nuclear weapons is a matter of focused international attention, attempts to establish 
prohibitions are confounded by disagreement about what ‘having’ these weapons 
means in the first place.  Should the desire to control only require action in addressing 
the actual possession of weapons, the believed intention of acquiring them, or the 
potential capability to do so?  As well, the recurring interest in countries such as the 
United States and the Russian Federation into developing ‘tactical’ (low yield) 
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nuclear weapons and incapacitating biochemical agents indicate the potential 
importance of circumstantial and consequential considerations in determinations of 
the rights and wrongs of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.   
 
This book examines attempts to limit, regulate, and outlaw the development and use 
of weaponry in relation to humanitarian concerns; or just how it is possible to set the 
‘limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity’ 
to quote from the ground breaking 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg.  It considers 
the challenges of cutting through complex and often contested situations in order to 
offer appraisals of what prohibitions are prudent and workable.  It asks what is at 
stake in how determinations are made about what constitutes ‘appropriate’ or 
‘inappropriate’ technologies of violence.  On what basis then, do individuals identify 
particular forms of inflicting death and injury as unacceptable whereas others are 
deemed permissible or at least tolerable?  Determinations of the acceptability of force 
and thus the need for prohibitions are not commonly conceived across the globe or 
invariant over time, but rather topics of dispute and reappraisal.  
 
Stated in somewhat different terms, this book searches for meaning about the 
acceptability of force and technology -- how problems are identified and how 
evaluations are negotiated.  It considers how classifications are marshaled to impose 
an understanding on controversial events so as to suggest what should be done and 
when enough has been done.  Just how determinations are made of what is really 
taking place and why are matters of some importance that arguably raise highly 
problematic empirical and ethical questions.  As contended here, discussions about 
the merits of force and the prohibition of weapons are characterized by a complex 
inter-play between moments of treating the world as fixed, determinate, and known 
and alternatively treating it as fluid, indeterminate and unknown.  While attempts to 
capture some definitive understanding of what is taking place and why that might 
underpin control measures are ever elusive, attempts to devise prohibitions necessitate 
trying to do just that.   
 
As argued, the fundamental and (in many respects) inescapable disagreements and 
controversies associated with specifying the acceptability of weaponry should serve to 
alert us to the pervasive problems associated with the very analysis of this topic.  So, 
as this book considers contentions with devising and enforcing prohibitions, it seeks 
to work out something the problems of associated with analyzing the acceptability of 
force.  In doing so, it scrutinizes how descriptions, evidence and arguments are 
employed to justify conclusions about the appropriateness of weaponry and 
equipment.   
 
Overall, this book seeks to bring the study of arms control up to date theoretically and 
empirically.  In doing so it addresses varied substantive, conceptual and practical 
issues associated with establishing and policing ethical limits on technology. 
 
The Meaning of Metal  
 
As a starting point into the wide ranging analysis that follows, the remainder of this 
chapter considers disputes about the humanitarian acceptability of so-called “leg-
irons”. As will be elaborated in later chapters, debates about the appropriateness of 
the development or employment of certain weapons often involves weighing 
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complicated evidential claims in circumstances where uncertainties are rife.  As 
opposed to the complexity of modern high-tech weapons, restraint technology such as 
handcuffs and leg cuffs consist of little more than the cuff ‘bracelets’ themselves and 
linking devices.  Used by incarceration centers, police agencies, military forces, and 
paramilitary organizations across the world for centuries, the case of physical restraint 
equipment would seem to be a straightforward area for devising and implementing 
controls.  Briefly considering why this is not the case and why the very analysis of 
debates about restraint technologies should not be taken as straightforward will 
indicate something of the themes elaborated in later chapters.  
 
Shortly after coming into political office, as part of its promise to bring an ethical 
dimension to the UK’s foreign policy, in July 1997 the British Labour Government 
announced that it ‘would take the necessary measures to prevent the export or 
transhipment from the UK’ of various equipment designed primarily for torture and 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; this including ‘leg-irons, gang-chains, 
shackles—excluding normal handcuffs—and electric-shock belts designed for the 
restraint of a human being’.  The statement set out an official classification of what 
various forms of leg restraints were primarily for (i.e., torture or other forms of cruel 
treatment) and thus their offensiveness.  Since that time the UK has publicly 
supported a similar classification be adopted by European Union under its Code of 
Conduct on Arms Exports.  
 
Concern about the need for prohibitions on the export of leg-irons (sometimes called 
leg cuffs) did not begin or end with the 1997 statement.  In a 1992 publication entitled 
Repression Trade (UK): How the UK Makes Torture and Death its Business,
2
 the 
human rights group Amnesty International provided an account of its previous 
encounters with restraint controls.  As told therein, in 1983 two reporters from the 
newspaper the Daily Mirror were offered a supply of leg-irons from the company 
Hiatts based in Birmingham, England. Citing evidence regarding abuses committed 
with leg-irons and their medical effects, Amnesty International led a campaign against 
their export.  In March 1984, the then Conservative government announced that 
‘Licences will not be issued for the export to any destination of leg-irons, shackles 
and gang-chains for the restraint of prisoners.’
3
   
 
Just what the phrase ‘leg-irons, shackles and gang-chains’ meant came under question 
in 1991 when undercover human rights workers attending the Covert and Operational 
Procurement Exhibition (London) obtained a brochure for leg cuffs through a US 
company called Hiatt Thompson.  Hiatt Thompson was formed in 1985 through a 
joint venture by Hiatts of England and the US Thompson Corporation.  The brochure 
indicated the materials had been manufactured in Birmingham, England.   
 
In an attempt to explain how British manufactured components were still appearing in 
prohibited leg cuffs, on 17 October 1991 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
Tim Sainsbury announced: ‘The export of leg irons, shackles--excluding handcuffs--
and gang chains is subject to control under the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1989 
and requires an export licence from my Department.’  The Secretary explained that 
while no export licenses had been granted for ‘leg-irons’ in recent years, licenses had 
been ‘issued for "oversized handcuffs" and linking chains’.
4
  The potential for 
evading export controls for ‘leg cuffs’ through shipping their individual component 
parts (labeled as ‘oversized handcuffs’) lead to an official redefinition of the term 
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‘handcuff’.  Secretary Sainsbury declared that in the future, for the purposes of export 
controls, handcuffs would be defined as restraints where ‘the maximum length of two 
cuffs and connecting chain [is] 240 mm. This standard would bring “oversized 
handcuffs” under control. The only United Kingdom exporter is being advised.’   
 
Amnesty International later reported the spirit of the export regulations were violated 
in 1995 when journalists bought Hiatt leg cuffs in the US.  In this case, ‘It would 
seem that Hiatts had been exporting oversized handcuffs to a US company called 
Hiatt Thompson, where longer chains were added to turn them into leg cuffs, whose 
sale and export is still legal in the United States.’
5
 
Just as what separates a ‘leg cuff’ from a ‘handcuff’ has been a topic of disagreement, 
so too has the desirability of prohibiting the former.  Both the 1997 Labour 
government policy and Amnesty International’s position condemning leg cuffs are 
bound up with their classification as tools for torture or cruel treatment.  In 1992, for 
instance, Amnesty International called for a prohibition on the manufacture of 
equipment that can only be used ‘for torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment of prisoners’, this including ‘leg-irons and gang chains’.
6
  
Cited as part of the case for this, the organization argued, ‘Leg-irons are designed to 
restrict severely the movement of prisoners. Their use is specifically prohibited by 
Rule 33 of the 1955 United Nations’ Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners.’
7
  This rule states ‘Instruments of restraint, such as handcuffs, chains, irons 
and strait-jackets, shall never be applied as a punishment.  Furthermore, chains or 
irons shall not be used as restraints.’
8
  Amnesty International’s condemnation of leg-
cuffs was also supported by numerous accounts of how the equipment had been used 
and to what results.  To cite just one account:  
Leg-irons are designed to severely restrict a prisoner's movement, making the 
wearer unstable and liable to overbalance, and often causing chafing of the skin. 
Welts and sores appear on the ankles of prisoners restrained in leg-irons after 
approximately 24 hours. They can also be used to facilitate torture. 
Patrick Foster witnessed fellow prisoners hung upside down by the leg-irons 
they were wearing and beaten [in Saudi Arabia]. Orton Chirwa [of Malawi] was 
handcuffed, leg-ironed and held in a squatting position by a metal bar behind his 
knees for two days and nights. Sipho Pityana, a former prisoner in South Africa 
described how leg-irons were used to torture him: "They tied electric wires on 
the irons... so the iron was a contact between the flesh and the electric device." 
Sipho also described how his captors used the leg-irons to hold him upside 
down in the sea for long periods of time.
9
 
That such practices should lead to categorical condemnations of leg cuffs has not been 
shared everywhere.  In contrast to outlawing a whole class of technology, security 
agencies in countries such as the US have sought to adopt guidelines for how leg 
restraints ought to be used in order to minimize any potential for serious harm or 
misuse.  The use of leg restraints on prisoners is fairly widespread in domestic 
incarnation settings and they have also figured into high profile military operations 
including the imprisonment of detainees in Camp X-Ray at Guantanamo Bay.
10
  Such 
policies seek to make a legitimate place for leg-irons by shifting the focus from leg 
cuffs themselves to how they are used and by whom.  Herein categorical 
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condemnations misconstrue the source of any problems.  How can a whole class of 
technology (so ubiquitous in the US) be ruled out?   
 
The potential for legitimate practices with leg-irons is at least acknowledged in the 
1955 United Nations’ Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.
11
  
While (as noted by Amnesty International) Rule 33 specifies irons should not be used 
as restraints, all of the UN recommendations are prefaced with the qualification that: 
the rules cover a field in which thought is constantly developing.  They are not 
intended to preclude experiment and practices, provided these are in harmony 
with the principles and seek to further the purposes which derive from the text 
of the rules as a whole. It will always be justifiable for the central prison 
administration to authorize departures from the rules in this spirit.  
Just what counts as ‘in harmony’ with the principles expressed in the rules ‘as a 
whole’ is a key question. 
 
Returning to the 1997 Labour government policy announcement, disputes similar to 
those surrounding the meaning of leg cuffs that preceded the announcement 
subsequently followed it.  In November 1999 the newspaper The Independent 
reported that two of its journalists purchased Hiatt Thompson leg-irons in the US with 
'Made in England' engraved on the cuffs and the Birmingham-based Hiatt’s address 
printed on the box.
12
  Chuck Thompson of Hiatt Thompson reportedly said such 
restraints were needed for criminals and others in the US because ‘Their guys are big 
animals.  They do more kicking now because they watch all this Bruce Lee fist 
fighting’.  When asked to explain how such UK-made products were still available for 
sale, Mr. Thompson said the cuffs for the leg-irons ‘must have been old stock from 
the early 1980s’.  This contention was challenged by the British Member of 
Parliament (MP) David Chidgey during a House of Commons meeting when he stated 
the leg-cuffs and chains in question ‘were bright, shiny and seemingly new.’  
Furthermore, added Chidgey: 
When Hiatt-Thompson, of the United States, was challenged on the manacles and 
chains, it claimed that they were made at its own premises, which turn out to be a 
warehouse that is barely the size of the average high-street shop. Thus a British 
company seems to be manufacturing components of banned instruments and 
implements of torture -- oversized cuffs and separate chains -- which, 
subsequently, are assembled overseas.  Moreover, the practice is perfectly legal 
under current legislation. Customs and Excise officers have seen components in 
packing cases, but are powerless to intervene in their export.
13
 
 
On 11 February 2000 the government Minister Peter Hain gave a Parliamentary 
statement maintaining that: ‘During the course of our investigations into the 
allegations in The Independent newspaper on 16 November that UK-made leg-irons 
were on sale in the US, we …. found no evidence that there had been a breach of the 
ban on the export of leg-irons.’
14
  Echoing Hiatt Thompson’s contention, Minister 
Hain said it appeared ‘likely’ the leg-irons were produced from old stock.  He went on 
to say ‘We are also satisfied that the leg-irons mentioned in The Independent articles 
were not manufactured using oversized individual cuffs exported without a licence 
from the UK. Although we have no evidence to suggest that such single cuffs have 
ever been exported, there is a hypothetical loophole and amending legislation to 
extend controls to cover large individual cuffs is in preparation.’  In July 2000 the UK 
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government announced that all cuffs with an internal diameter greater than 52 
millimeters would require a license.   
 
Related allegations about of the failure of British arms export policies were made in 
September 2000 when the newspaper The Guardian reported that a British company 
was willing to supply ‘barbaric torture equipment’ such as leg-irons to Rwanda where 
this equipment had been used in the past by military officers in acts of torture.
15
  In 
this case, the export controls were reportedly to be evaded through brokering the 
equipment to Rwanda by the Spanish firm Larrañaga y Elorza.
16
   
 
Attention returned to Hiatts of England again in late 2002 when the Birmingham 
newspaper the Sunday Mercury printed a story with the head caption ‘Exporters of 
Torture.’
17
  A journalist from the Sunday Mercury bought a pair of leg-cuffs from the 
US, compared them to over-sized ‘Big Brutus’ handcuffs made in England and 
concluded the cuffs were identical, with only the length of link chain separating the 
handcuffs from the leg cuffs.  A spokesperson from Amnesty International was 
quoted as saying ‘There are serious concerns that loopholes in the licensing system 
are allowing companies in Britain to export equipment that, once assembled overseas, 
can be used as leg-cuffs, manacles and other restraint devices frequently used by 
unscrupulous governments to inflict suffering.  This type of medieval metalwork 
would not be allowed for export from the UK.  Why is it apparently permissible for a 
British company to supply the key components of the products to its US distributor?’ 
In 2003 as part of the hearings of the House of Commons Committees on Strategic 
Export Controls – a body set up by the Labour government to provide parliamentary 
oversight of its export decisions – some of the questions surrounding over-sized 
handcuffs and leg cuffs were put to government officials.  In an exchange that evokes 
images of an export system simultaneously transparent and nontransparent as well as 
functioning and dysfunctional, David Chidgey MP and Tim Dowse (Head of the Non-
Proliferation Department of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office) debated the 
merits of licenses to various countries which the government asked to be unidentified 
in the public record: 
David Chidgey: …in a further memorandum to the Committee the Government 
says that "Handcuffs were licensed for export to reputable organisations akin 
to" our own UK Prison Service, for example, in Canada, New Zealand, 
Australia and America. They were "for use either in escorting or transporting 
prisoners. There was no clear risk of use for internal repression in any of 
these cases. Handcuffs licensed to the *** were also for use in escorting 
prisoners."  I want to ask you…was there a clear risk of use for internal 
repression in the case of the handcuffs permitted for export to ***? 
Tim Dowse: I think that in terms of the licences that you are referring to—and we 
approved one and I think refused two—the cases involved different types of 
handcuffs in each case. To run through them, in the case of licence 28374, 
which we approved, the goods involved were normal over-sized handcuffs. 
We did not believe that there was a clear risk that the *** would use them in 
any way other than as over-sized handcuffs. In the case of licence 17084, ***. 
We have no particular grounds for concern that the *** would misuse the 
equipment, but we did nevertheless judge that there was a clear risk that it 
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could clearly easily be disassembled and reassembled in the form of leg-irons 
and therefore was covered by the scope of our export ban. A similar 
consideration was applied in the case of licence 21003. So I think it is an 
example, if you like, of the really rather detailed care that we do give in 
assessing individual licences case by case. 
David Chidgey: I will shorten this, but I would just make the point that the 
concern that we have is that the export licence that was granted was granted 
to escort handcuffs that in fact could be converted to shackles or leg-irons by 
virtue of a steel chain. I just make the point, rather than ask for an answer. 
There is a further point, if I may very quickly. This again refers to a specified 
end-use of a licence issued for the export of over-sized *** handcuffs which 
were the same mark and model as you have just referred to from ***.  This 
was to ***. According to their own directives, leg-irons must be used for all 
inmates deemed to be a security risk and so on, but in this specification at 
their own direction they are saying that "*** cuffs shall be used".  The end-
user of the over-sized handcuffs licensed for export to *** requires the use of 
leg-irons whenever a prisoner is deemed a security risk. My concern, and the 
Committee's concern, is that in this case, where they prescribed that this 
should be used, they are actually specifying that they should use *** cuffs 
with "minimum one arm and one leg cuffed to secured bed or examining 
table".  So what we are really seeking is, what assurances has the Government 
received that the *** cuffs licensed for export to the *** will not be used as 
shackles or leg-irons? How can we have any confidence about that, when they 
are actually specifying how they should be used? 
Tim Dowse: The short answer is that we did not seek assurances. When the 
assessment of the risk was made, we judged that we had no end-user 
concerns. We will obviously be interested in any information you can pass to 
us.  
While the Committees on Strategic Export Controls noted in its report following the 
hearing that they ‘would not expect oversized handcuffs to be the Government's top 
priority among military exports of potential concern’
18
 they criticized a number of 
‘administrative failures’, including the handcuff cases alluded to in the previous 
quote.  Nevertheless, the Committees concluded that overall the ‘export control 
system usually—eventually—produces the right results…The Government deserves 
praise for the transparency that it has brought to its operation of strategic export 
controls and to the policy refinements it has introduced. But a little information can be 
more frustrating than none at all.’ 
 
The preceding text indicates something of dispute about the rights and wrongs of 
restraint technologies and what should be done about them.  Various sources of 
concern have been singled out – the entire class of leg cuff technology, the rules in 
place for their use, the ‘big animals’ they are used on, and the potential for restraints 
to be disassembled and reassembled.  The repeated introduction of controls for leg 
cuffs has been followed by questions about whether these measures are prudent or 
being adhered to.  At this early stage in the book, let me suggest a few preliminary 
observations regarding what the case of leg restraints might suggest about 
prohibitions.   
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First, the idea that concerns about the rigor of export controls will be resolved through 
the next tightening up of export controls is questionable.  Categories and rules about 
even the simplest of technologies are not merely applied, but interpreted and 
negotiated.  What differentiates leg cuffs from handcuffs, handcuffs from oversized 
cuffs and even ‘normal over-sized handcuffs’ from presumably un-normal over-sized 
cuffs has not been something spelled at one time for all times.  Rather, for the 
purposes of export controls such distinctions have been remolded and reconfigured in 
response to criticisms of practices.  With further events or technical developments, the 
existing understanding of categories will again be re-worked. 
 
Along these lines, for instance, following various controversies about the role of its 
Member States’ exports in human rights abuses, the European Parliament has called 
for the European Community to both place a ‘ban on the promotion, trade and export 
of police and security equipment whose use is inherently cruel, inhuman or degrading, 
including leg-irons, electroshock stun-belts and inherently painful devices such as 
serrated thumb cuffs’ and ‘suspend the transfer of equipment where its use in practice 
has revealed a substantial risk of abuse or unwarranted injury, such as leg-cuffs, 
shackle boards, restraint chairs and pepper gas weapons’ (emphases added).
19
 This 
parliamentary ‘resolution’ aims to make a division between leg-irons which are 
deemed intolerable outright and leg-cuffs whose acceptability depends on how they 
are used.  In doing so it challenges the British government totalizing categorization 
that all leg restraints are primarily for torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.  With the European Parliament’s distinction, current or future plastic or 
Velcro-based leg restraints, for instance, might count as ‘cuffs’ rather than ‘irons’.  
Yet, on just what basis leg-irons should be distinguished from leg cuffs is not 
specified in the resolution.  The distinction has played no part in the implementation 
of British controls. Should such a division be made though, there seems enough 
historical precedent for safely assuming its meaning would be matter of imaginative 
argumentation.  
 
As a second observation, discussions about the adequacy of prohibitions cannot be 
separated from questions about who is able to comment about such measures.  Not 
every thing – classification, export decision, use of force, etc. – that is contestable is 
contested in practice.  As suggested above, despite repeated claims by governmental 
representatives that certain exports are prevented, holes in legislation are being 
plugged, and that proper licensing decisions are being made, through campaigning 
and investigative activities outsiders to the corridors of power have challenged such 
optimistic appraisals.  Had it not been for such efforts it seems doubtful that 
successive British governments would have revised exports control classifications in 
the manner they did.  While the text above would suggest that intense and wide 
ranging media scrutiny has been cast on British exports, this is an artifact of the 
specific argument made.  All of the newspaper stories cited, at least in large part, 
derive from the behind the scenes primary investigative work of one small and 
precariously funded research organization based in England.  This situation would 
suggest some caution in speaking about the adequacies and inadequacies of 
prohibitions.  What is known, what is debated, what is considered to be the state of 
world is a function of who is in a position to know and say. 
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Third and related to this, whether the failures of export controls suggested above 
should be taken as justifying a skeptical or cynical orientation to official statements is 
a topic of some importance.  Yet, any assessment of this will no doubt depend on 
evaluations made of a range of other issues.  For instance, the proposed continuing 
deficiencies associated with regulating restraints could be taken as indicating an 
inability or unwillingness of governments to act in a manner consistent with their 
stated principles.  To the proposal that the granting of questioned licenses proves the 
UK exports system is in ‘shambles’, government officials would likely respond as UK 
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw did respond when this was put to him: ‘Hang on…I do 
not accept that for a second. There may be discrepancies sometimes, but this is a very 
carefully administered system, all right, and I do not think that kind of description is 
at all justified. It is a complex system, complex because Parliament, quite properly, 
required that it should be thorough.’
20
  Rather than being contingent matters of 
priority and purpose, however regrettable, dubious export licenses are presented as 
inevitable lapses due to the complications of the matters at hand.  Whether or not such 
licenses should be understood as unavoidable or not depends on assessments of the 
practical ability of officials to scrutinize export applications.   
 
Likewise, assessments of whether the continuing deficiencies of export policy in 
relation to restraint exports reflect some unwillingness of governmental officials to act 
in a manner consistent with their stated principles can depend what is taken as a 
relevant context for making judgments.  It is in relation to some sense of context that 
particular decisions are given their meaning.  So while noting various ‘discrepancies’ 
or ‘administrative failures’ of exports controls, the Committees on Strategic Export 
Controls nevertheless gave the Labour government an overall positive evaluation 
citing the initiatives it had undertaken to improve decision making transparency– not 
least the establishment of the Committees on Strategic Export Controls.  As noted 
above, that the Committees did not think leg restraints would be ‘the Government's 
top priority among military exports’ is another way of minimizing the relevancy of 
certain dubious transfers.  Instead of focusing on these procedural changes, those that 
doubt the sincerity of government policy in the area of leg restraints have done so by 
situating it to a string of other questionable past transfers.
21
  Instead of praising the 
Labour government for making improvements in export transparency (save for a 
discussion of *** country and ***cuffs as illustrated above), it could be criticized for 
failing to take other steps such as prohibiting the manufacture (rather than merely the 
export) of cuffs that are incorporated into leg cuffs.  The set of contested relevances 
forwarded is central to alternative justifications for what has happened and why, and 
thereby what if anything is required in terms of further action.   
 
Restricting a discussion of the difficulties associated with giving meaning to decisions 
about exports as done in the last few paragraphs arguably provides a fairly limited 
analysis.  If a ‘little information can be more frustrating than none at all’ for 
committees scrutinizing export decisions then the same could be said for those 
reading case studies of prohibitions.  The analysis presented in this chapter can be 
questioned in the same way accounts given by human rights groups or Parliamentary 
committees were questioned above.  Nothing like a full and comprehensive historical 
analysis has (or indeed could) been given of prohibitions for leg restraints in the UK; 
not least because what should be taken as relevant to such a discussion is itself 
debated and part of justifying what appraisal should be given of the situation.  This 
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condition poses significant questions for the import and purpose of analysis, issues 
that deserve considered attention. 
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